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THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 
Shlomo Slonim* 
Of all the complaints lodged by the Antifederalists in their 
campaign to defeat ratification of the Constitution, the failure to 
attach a bill of rights to the Constitution emerged as the leading 
and most formidable one.1 This omission represented an Achil-
les' heel that might very well have doomed the process of ratifi-
cation.2 In the 1787 Constitutional Convention, it will be re-
called, no one thought of the need for a bill of rights until 
Virginian delegate George Mason raised the issue just several 
days before the Convention was due to rise on September 17. "It 
would give great quiet to the people," he said? Thereupon, El-
bridge Gerry of Massachusetts submitted a proposal for adding a 
bill of rights to the Constitution which Mason seconded. The 
Convention unanimously rejected the proposal by a vote of 10 to 0, 
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1. Thus, the Dissent of the minority in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, is-
sued on December 18, 1787 states: "The first consideration that this review [of the Con-
stitution) suggests is the omission of a BILL OF RIGHTS." 21HE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF TilE RATIFICATION OF TilE CONSTITUTION 630 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Sala-
dino eds., 1976) (hereinafter DHRC). And George Lee Turbeville, in a letter to James 
Madison dated December 11, writes: "The principal objection that the opponents bring 
forward against this Constitution, is the total want of a Bill of Rights." 8 id. at 232. And 
in a subsequent letter to Madison dated April 16, 1788, Turbeville refers to the demand 
for the adoption of a bill of rights as "the favorite Topic of the ablest Antifoederal de-
darners." ld. 234-35 n.3. James Wilson, at one point, referred to the complaint over the 
omission of a bill of rights as "this [subject) so violently supported out of doors." 2 id. at 
469-70. 
2. As Robert Rutland has written, "(T]he Antifederalists stumbled upon one over-
sight in the Constitution that bore the appearance of an Achilles' heel"; and they "as-
siduously promoted the idea that the failure to include a bill of rights was not an over-
sight, but a studied bit of Federalist deception." ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE 
ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION 
STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788, at 32-33 (1966). 
3. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
587-88 (Sept. 12, 1787) (1937). 
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with one state absent.4 Failure to heed Mason's counsel was to 
plague the Federalists throughout the ratification campaign. 
Already in the first major confrontation over ratifying the 
Constitution, which took place in Pennsylvania several weeks af-
ter the close of the Constitutional Convention, the Seceders 
from the state Assembly called upon their electorate to consider 
whether the rights of citizens could be regarded as safe under a 
constitution which did not contain a bill of rights.5 In the same 
state, Samuel Bryan, in his first essay on the topic, Centinel 1, 
published on October 5, 1787, declared that the absence of a bill 
of rights made it essential for a second constitutional convention 
to be held to rectify the errors and omissions of the first.6 
In response to these charges, James Wilson, who contrib-
uted significantly to the drafting of the Constitution as a member 
of the Pennsylvania delegation to the Constitutional Convention, 
and who was a prominent legal scholar who would subsequently 
serve as a Justice on the original U.S. Supreme Court, enunci-
ated a thesis which distinguished between a government of 
unlimited powers and one of enumerated and defined powers. 
The former, as illustrated by the state governments, were sover-
eign in their authority and had free rein to exercise any and all 
powers, but the latter, as illustrated by the federal government, 
could only exercise those powers which it disposed of under the 
Constitution. There was, therefore no fear that the federal gov-
ernment could threaten the rights of citizens in such matters as 
freedom of the press, freedom of religion etc., since it was pow-
erless to operate in such spheres. Wilson explained: 
There are two kinds of government; that where general power 
is intended to be given to the legislature and that where the 
powers are particularly enumerated. In the last case, the im-
plied result is, that nothing more is intended to be given, than 
what is so enumerated, unless it results from the nature of the 
government itself. . . . [I]n a government like the proposed 
one, there can be no necessity for a bill of rights. For ... the 
people never part with their power. . . . [W]e are told, that 
there is no security for the rights of conscience. I ask ... what 
part of this system puts it in the power of Congress to attack 
4. !d. at 582, 588. 
5. 2 DHRC, supra note 1, at 71, 128-31; 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
Pennsylvania 13-16 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981) [hereinafter STORING]. 
6. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST at 136-43; 13 DHRC, supra note 1, at 328-
37. For background to the appearance of Centinel, see id. at 326. 
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those rights? When there is no power to attack, it is idle to 
prepare the means of defense.7 
And Justice Thomas McKean of the Pennsylvania judiciary, 
likewise contended that a bill of rights was superfluous in the 
federal constitution: 
[I]t has already been incontrovertibly shown that on the pre-
sent occasion a bill of rights was totally unnecessary, and that 
it might be accompanied with some inconveniency and danger 
if there was any defect in the attempt to enumerate the privi-
leges of the people. This system proposes a union of thirteen 
sovereign and independent states in order to give dignity and 
energy to the transaction of their common concerns. It would 
be idle, therefore to countenance the idea that any other 
powers were delegated to the general government than those 
specified in the Constitution itself.8 
If a person possessed of 1,000 acres decides to convey 250 acres, 
"is it necessary to reserve the 750?" he asked.9 "[T]he whole plan 
of government [of the Constitution] is nothing more than a bill 
of rights-a declaration of the people in what manner they 
choose to be governed."10 "It seems," he said, "that the honor-
able members are so afraid the Congress will do soine mischief 
that they are determined to deny them the power to do any 
good. "11 In conclusion, he exhorted the delegates to ratify the 
Constitution and declared: 
But sir, perfection is not to be expected in the business of this 
life; and it is so ordered by the wisdom of Providence that as 
our stay in this world seldom exceeds three score and ten 
years, we may not become too reluctant to part with its en-
joyments, but by reflecting upon the imperfections of the pre-
sent, learn in time to prepare for the perfection of a future 
state. Let us, then, Mr. President, be content to accept this 
system as the best which can be obtained. 12 
Given the prominence and centrality which the issue of a 
bill of rights assumed in the struggle over ratification, it might 
have been expected that the authors of the Federalist Papers 
7. 2 id. at 470-71; see also id. at 167-68; also reproduced 13 id. at 339-40. For dis-
cussion of Wilson's presentation and the reaction to it, see id. at 337-39. 
8. 2 DHRC,supra note I, at 412. 
9. /d. at 546-47. 
10. /d. at 387. 
11. /d. at 414. 
12. /d. at 418. 
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would take note of this complaint and immediately issue a rebut-
tal. After all, Hamilton in Federalist 1, in explaining the purpose 
of the series wrote, that in addition to explaining the insuffi-
ciency of the Articles of Confederation for preservation of the 
Union and the merits of the new Constitution, the series would 
also "endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objec-
tions" which "shall have been raised against the Constitution." 
And yet, the fact is that the Federalist Papers remain silent on 
this topic until practically the end of the series. Only in Federalist 
84, one before the last, does Hamilton address the question of a 
bill of rights, and then, as Jack Rakove has justly said, as a sort 
of afterthought, in the process of tying up all loose ends.13 
What is particularly surprising is that Madison seems to 
have completely ignored the subject, contenting himself to 
merely saying that the Articles of Confederation were equally 
without a bill of rights. (Federalist 38). This very inadequate re-
sponse to the hue and cry of the Antifederalists, appears also to 
disregard the view of Madison's mentor, Thomas Jefferson, who 
in a letter to him dated December 12, 1787, sharply attacked 
Wilson's thesis that a bill of rights was not needed in the case of 
a government of limited powers. The thesis, Jefferson said, was 
"gratis dictum," i.e. gratuitous, and "opposed by strong infer-
ences from the body of the instrument" of the Constitution. He 
pointed out that in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the 
Constitution contained no clause to the effect that "every 
power ... not ... expressly delegated to the United States in 
Congress" was retained by the states. "A bill of rights," he de-
clared, "is what the people are entitled to against every govern-
ment on earth, general or particular [i.e. national or state], and 
what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference. "14 
In fact, however, Madison had not forgotten about a bill of 
rights and its non-inclusion in the Constitution. He addressed the 
issue in the Federalist Papers, but his answer was an oblique one, 
not direct. He spoke of rights and not of a bill of rights. His re-
13. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 327 (1996). 
14. Letter of Dec. 12, 1787, in 12 JEFFERSON, PAPERS 440. Jefferson also took issue 
with Wilson's attempted justification of the Convention's failure to institute jury trial in 
civil cases because it had been cancelled in several states. He wrote: 
It was a hard conclusion to say because some [states] have been so incautious as 
to abandon this mode of trial, therefore the more prudent states shall be re-
duced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much more just and 
wise to have concluded the other way that as most of the states had judiciously 
preserved this palladium, those who had wandered should be brought back to it, 
and to have established general right instead of general wrong. 
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sponse appears in the second half of Federalist 51, which echoes 
the thesis Madison enunciated in Federalist 10 regarding the vir-
tues of a multiplicity of sects arising out of an expansion of terri-
tory. Contrary to what some people think, 51 is not simply a 
repetition of 10, nor are there grounds for their puzzlement over 
the fact that Madison found it appropriate to re-insert this argu-
ment in an article devoted to discussing the separation of pow-
ers.15 In Federalist 10 Madison prescribed a formula for overcom-
ing the bane of factions; in Federalist 51 he employed it to 
explain why rights would be safe under the Constitution. The 
two issues are related, but they are not the same. In 10, Madison 
expounded the thesis that a system of representative govern-
ment, combined with expansion of territory, would result in a 
multiplicity of interests that would neutralize one another, thus 
helping to curb the force of faction, i.e. of party, in the legisla-
ture. In 51, the first half is devoted to explaining how the opera-
tion of the separation of powers would prevent any one branch 
of the federal government from monopolizing power and insti-
tuting a tyranny; the second half is devoted to showing how a 
multiplicity of sects and interests in the United States will ensure 
that individual rights are protected. There is no reference here to 
a system of representative government as a means of curbing 
faction, since he is talking about protecting the rights of indi-
viduals. But the upshot is that a bill of rights is not required un-
der the federal Constitution. As Madison put it in the second 
half of 51: 
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the 
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one 
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Dif-
ferent interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. 
If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the 
minority will be insecure. 
15. See DA VIO F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 142-46 
(1984), who struggles with the need to explain what the second half of Federalist 51 adds 
to Federalist 10, and why Madison found it necessary to repeat a thesis he had already 
expounded. 
Madison, it should be noted, even before the Convention, had already enunciated 
his thesis that enlargement of the sphere would help divide the community into numer-
ous clashing sects and interests. See "Vices of the Political System of the United States" 
(April 1787), 9 MADISON, PAPERS 355-57. He presented the thesis to the delegates at 
one of the first sessions of the Convention, on June 6, 1787. 10 id. at 33. After the Con-
vention, he reiterated the thesis to Jefferson in his letter of Oct. 24, 1787. /d. at 213-i4. 
Thus, Federalist Nos. 10 and 5/ reflected a longstanding notion of Madison. 
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There were only two methods of "providing against this evil," 
said Madison. One, was to create "a will in the community inde-
pendent of the majority," as illustrated by a monarch.16 The 
other, was "by comprehending in the society so many descrip-
tions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a major-
ity of the whole very improbable." The latter method was exem-
plified in the federal republic of the United States. 
Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent 
on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many 
parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of indi-
viduals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from inter-
ested combinations of the majority. In a free government the 
security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious 
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of inter-
ests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of 
security in both cases will depend on the number of interests 
and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent 
of country and number of people comprehended under the 
same government. 
In a small state like Rhode Island, continued Madison, there was 
every probability of "reiterated oppressions" by "factious ma-
jorities." It was different with "the extended republic of the 
United States." Given "the great variety of interests, parties, and 
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole 
society could seldom take place on any other principles than 
those of justice and the general good." And justice, Madison 
stressed, "is the end of government. It is the end of civil society." 
Thus, by propounding a thesis to explain how citizens' rights 
would be safeguarded under the new Constitution, Madison 
effectively countered the Antifederalist argument for a bill of 
rights. His presentation does not refer directly to the Antifeder-
alists, but the implication is clear for them to note. If rights are 
secure, there is no need for a document spelling out a bill of 
rights. 
In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison had occasion 
to reiterate the analysis he had spelled out in Federalist 51, and 
also to allude by inference to Wilson's thesis. Patrick Henry had 
charged that the Constitution was seriously flawed for lack of a 
16. The question naturally arises whether Madison meant that a judicial body could 
also serve this purpose. Given his subsequent opposition to judicial review this assump-
tion seems doubtful. See "Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Vir-
ginia" (Oct. 15, 1788); 11 MADISON, supra note 15, at 293. 
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bill of rights. Thus, religion, he declared, is not guarded. 17 In re-
sponse, Madison queried whether a bill of rights was a security 
for religion. 
Would the bill of rights in this State exempt the people from 
paying for the support of one particular sect, if such were ex-
clusively established by law? If there were a majority of one 
sect, a bill of rights would be a poor protection for liberty. 
Happily for the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of relig-
ion. This freedom arises from the multiplicity of sects, which 
pervades America, and which is the best and only security for 
religious liberty in any society .... There is not a shadow of 
right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. 
Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpa-
tion .... [T]he United States abound in such a variety of sects, 
that it is a strong security against religious persecution, and is 
sufficient to authorise a conclusion, that no one sect will ever 
be able to out-number or depress the rest. 18 
Madison's response helped disarm Patrick Henry's charge re-
garding the omission of a bill of rights, and enabled the Virginia 
Convention to proceed and ratify the Constitution.19 
Madison's analysis in the second half of Federalist 51 per-
haps explains why Hamilton found it possible to avoid address-
ing the question of a bill of rights until Federalist 84. The publi-
cation of Madison's thesis on a multiplicity of interests operating 
as an effective surety for individual rights, and this, coming on top 
of Wilson's contention that a bill of rights was uncalled for under 
a government of enumerated powers, apparently convinced him 
that he need not address the subject. But the persistence and fe-
rocity of the Antifederalist campaign, and its concentration on the 
absence from the Constitution of a bill of rights, apparently per-
suaded Hamilton that he could not avoid publishing his own re-
joinder. As will be seen, his comments, while they included a ref-
erence to Wilson's thesis, also presented an additional and 
entirely different line of argument. And as for Madison's thesis, 
although Hamilton did not react publicly to it, privately he seems 
to have entertained some doubts about its strength and general 
applicability.Z0 In this regard it should be noted, that Hamilton's 
reference, in Federalist 9, to ENLARGEMENT OF THE 
17. 10 DHRC, supra note 1, at 1213. 
18. !d. at 1223-24. 
19. See id. at 1540 (June 25, 1788). 
20. See Hamilton's minutes at the Convention for June 6. 1 FARRAND, supra note 
3, at 146-47; 10 MADISON, supra note 15, at 34 n.2. 
158 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:151 
ORBIT as a salutary factor in the creation of the United States, 
relates to the advantages of a federal arrangement over consoli-
dation into a single unitary state. It does not bear on the subject 
matter of Madison's thesis. 
Hamilton's first point in Federalist 84 is to note that the con-
stitutions of various states, including New York itself, contain no 
separate bill of rights. And, if in answer it is contended that 
rights are strewn throughout the body of the New York constitu-
tion, the same is true, said Hamilton, in the case of the federal 
Constitution, so that the sum total of rights is no less numerous 
and no less significant. The provision on habeas corpus, and the 
prohibition on ex post facto laws and of titles of nobility in the 
federal Constitution, could be labelled as the most meaningful 
"securities to liberty and republicanism." The ban on titles of 
nobility, in fact, "may truly be denominated the corner-stone of 
republican government." 
Furthermore, said Hamilton, bills of rights are appropriate 
for stipulations between kings and their subjects, but "have no 
application to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power 
of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives 
and servants." "Here," he declared, echoing Wilson, "the people 
surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no 
need of reservations." And in words, quoting the opening 
phrases of the Constitution, Hamilton continued: 
WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the bless-
ings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity do ordain and es-
tablish this Constitution' ... is a better recognition of popular 
rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which ... sound much 
better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of govern-
ment. 
But, in fact, said Hamilton, a document "intended to regu-
late the general political interests of the nation," or of a state, 
does not require "a minute detail of particular rights." More-
over, a bill of rights might even be dangerous, since "they would 
contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this 
very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more 
than was granted." 
For why declare that things shall not be done which there is 
no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the 
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is 
given by which restrictions may be imposed? .... The Consti-
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tution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing 
against the abuse of an authority which was not given. 
Hamilton also queried whether it was possible to formulate 
a provision which would absolutely guarantee liberty of the 
press. "Who can give it any definition which would not leave the 
utmost latitude for evasion?" In an ultimate sense, Hamilton 
contended, " its security ... must altogether depend on public 
opinion." 
After presenting these various arguments, Hamilton in 
conclusion, enunciated a completely different thesis-that the 
Constitution, in and of itself, was a bill of rights. Earlier, it will 
be recalled, Judge McKean, in the Pennsylvania convention had 
made a similar claim,21 but Hamilton elaborated on the thesis: 
Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the po-
litical privileges of the citizens in the structure and administra-
tion of the government? This is done in the most ample and 
precise manner in the plan of the convention; comprehending 
various precautions for the public security .... Is another ob-
ject of a bill of rights to define certain immunities and modes 
of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private con-
cerns? This we have seen has also been attended to. 
In essence, what Hamilton is claiming is that a democratic 
system of government, in which all the office-holders are an-
swerable to the electorate at regular intervals, cannot become a 
despotic regime. The voters are at liberty to dismiss the office-
holders, be they in the executive or legislative branches of gov-
ernment, and thus bring about an end to oppressive or objec-
tionable policies. The rights of citizens are most securely pro-
tected by virtue of the system of government which shall be 
instituted in the United States. No bill of rights could possibly do 
more to protect the rights of individuals and minorities than the 
very structure of government itself. Liberty to change the com-
position of the governing bodies is the surest guarantee of the 
liberty of citizens, and all supplementary guarantees are, as 
Hamilton stressed, dangerous because they imply the existence 
of powers where none are designated, and misleading because in 
substance they cannot effectively protect. Thus, for Hamilton, 
the Constitution was the embodiment of all bills of rights that 
could realistically be conceived. 
21. See supra, text accompanying note 10. 
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In summation, it emerges that the authors of the Federalist 
Papers did not neglect the issue of a bill of rights in their discus-
sion. Three principal answers were supplied by the Federalists to 
justify the omission of a bill of rights from the Constitution, each 
of which was duly noted in the Federalist Papers (either ex-
pressly or implicitly) at one point or other. The first attempt to 
explain why a bill of rights was not required appears in the sec-
ond half of Federalist 51, where Madison replicates the thesis he 
had enunciated in Federalist 10. But whereas earlier he was in-
tent on demonstrating how the bane of factions in the legislature 
could be overcome, in 51 he seeks to explain why the rights of 
individuals will be secure. The enormous expanse of the United 
States, embracing as it did a vast variety of clashing interests and 
sects, would forestall legislation or executive action violating the 
rights of individuals. In effect, the different interests and sects 
would cancel one another out and prevent the imposition of 
policies designed to reward one group at the expense of another 
or to harm one set of individuals so as to benefit another set. The 
second argument to be noted in the Federalist was that of James 
Wilson (chronologically appearing first), according to which the 
federal constitution, providing for a federal government of lim-
ited and enumerated powers, did not allow a government to act 
except on the basis of granted powers. In the absence of a power 
bearing on rights, that government would be powerless to 
threaten the liberty of citizens. The third and final thesis was that 
of Alexander Hamilton which contended that the Constitution, 
in and of itself, was the greatest surety for the rights of individu-
als since it established a system of government which provided 
for free and regular elections. This would enable the electorate 
to react and cancel, by means of a changing of the guard, any 
and every policy which they found to be inimical to the rights of 
citizens. 
It is interesting to note that it did not take long for these 
three theories to be put to the test in determining which one 
most effectively protected the rights of citizens. In 1798 the U.S. 
Congress adopted the Alien and Sedition laws22 which, in the 
view of most subsequent commentators and opinions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, violated the Bill of Rights that had entered into 
force some seven years earlier.23 Obviously, neither the thesis of 
22. For background to the Alien and Sedition Acts, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 
at 590-93 (1993). 
23. Justice William J. Brennan, in his majority opinion in the case of New York 
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Wilson nor that of Madison had operated to prevent the adop-
tion of laws which were clearly partisan and inhibitive of free-
dom of speech and of the press. On the other hand, Hamilton's 
thesis would seem to have been vindicated, since Jefferson's vic-
tory in the 1800 elections was inspired, to a considerable degree, 
by the electorate's condemnation of the conduct of the Federal-
ists in infringing the liberties of the people.24 In the words of one 
prominent constitutional scholar, "the constitutionality of the 
Sedition Act ... was decided by the people in the national elec-
tions of 1800, which drove the Federalist party out of office and 
into oblivion."25 While in this instance even the Bill of Rights 
only served as a "parchment barrier"26 in protecting rights, ulti-
mate justice was enforced by the democratic right of the people 
to select the government of their choice and thereby determine 
the laws by which they shall be governed. This pattern of events 
gives rise to the engaging thought that perhaps Hamilton had it 
right after all, and the Bill of Rights merely made explicit what 
was implicit in the Constitution from the beginning.27 In later 
years, thanks to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the "parchment bar-
rier" was to assume an entirely different and much more formi-
dable character in guaranteeing individualliberty.28 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), declared that, while the validity of the Sedition 
Act was never determined in a court of law, "the attack upon its validity has carried the 
day in the court of history." /d. at 276 
24. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 22, at 725-27. 
25. LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 643-44 (2d ed. 1995). 
26. The term was used by Madison in correspondence with Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) 
to explain why he did not favor a bill of rights. Among the reasons he presented was the 
argument that "experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions 
when its controul is most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have 
been committed by overbearing majorities in every State." 11 MADISON, supra note 15, 
at 297. 
27. See two engaging articles that endorse such a thesis: Herbert J. Storing, "The 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights" in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE 
RIGHTS? 15-35 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985), and Walter 
Berns, "The Constitution as Bill of Rights" in id. at 50-73. 
28. On the doctrine of incorporation see, HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. 
PERRY, FREEDO~ AND THE COURT: CiVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 29-91 (7th ed. 1998). 
